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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses a unique data set on 143,000 poor households from Northern Bangladesh to 
analyze the effects of microfinance membership on a household’s ability to cope with seasonal 
famine known as Monga.  We develop an estimation strategy that exploits a jump and a kink at 
the 10 decimal land ownership threshold driven by MFI screening process to ensure repayment by 
excluding the ultra-poor. Evidence shows that microfinance membership improves food security 
during Monga, especially for the poorest households who survive at the margin of 1 and 2 meals 
a day. The positive effects on food security are, however, not driven by higher income, as 
microcredit does not improve the ability to migrate for work, nor does it reduce dependence on 
distress sale of labor. The evidence is consistent with consumption smoothing being the primary 
mechanism behind the gains in food security of MFI households during the season of starvation.     
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(1) Introduction 
Microfinance programs have become an integral part of the anti-poverty strategies in many 
developing countries over the last four decades. While proponents argue that microfinance has 
improved the lives of millions of poor people (especially women) by providing access to credit 
without collateral, the critics have raised serious doubts about its efficacy as a poverty alleviation 
tool and as a broader development strategy (for recent surveys of the literature, see Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2010), Banerjee et al. (2015), Mahmud and Osmani (2017)).2  
Although the initial focus of the literature on microcredit had been on the implications of 
missing credit market and the potential effects of relaxing binding credit constraint on household 
outcomes, it is now well appreciated that microcredit may at least partially be filling in for other 
missing markets.3  Microcredit in many cases works as an imperfect substitute for missing 
insurance and consumer credit markets.4 That the credit market can play an insurance role, 
especially when the credit contract is renegotiable, has been well-understood in the literature on 
consumption smoothing in developing countries (Udry (1990, 1994), Besley (1995), Morduch 
(1995, 2011)).5 Taking advantage of a unique data set on 143,000 poor and ultra-poor households 
and using the seasonal famine in Northern Bangladesh known as Monga as a case study, this paper 
provides evidence on the effectiveness of microfinance programs in coping with anticipated 
seasonal adversity in a rural economy.  Seasonality and seasonal hunger are not unique to 
Bangladesh, it is a feature of many poor agrarian economies (see Chambers et al. (1981), Devereux 
et al. (2012)). 
Almost every year during the months of September-November (before the Aman rice 
harvest), a large part of rural Northern Bangladesh, especially in the Greater Rangpur region, 
becomes vulnerable to seasonal famine or near famine situation. During this lean season, a large 
number of poor and extreme poor (ultra-poor) households cannot find any employment. The poor 
                                                 
2 Recent empirical analysis of the effects of microfinance includes six papers based on RCT in the special issue of 
American Economic Journal Applied Economics (2015). For papers using nonexperimental data, see Morduch and 
Roodman (2014), Menon (2006), among others. 
3 For example, Emran, Morshed and Stiglitz (2011) show that microcredit addresses simultaneously two missing 
markets: credit and labor.   
4 There is some evidence that many households use microcredit for consumption smoothing (an insurance market 
role), and for financing indivisible consumer durables such as bicycle and television (missing market for consumer 
credit), or other lumpy expenditures (such as financing migration and education). 
5 Microfinance NGOs are also increasingly offering explicit savings and insurance products to poor households (see 
Karlan and Morduch (2009) and Banerjee and Duflo (2011) for discussions). 
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and ultra-poor households thus turn to desperate measures to cope with the seasonal famine, such 
as reducing daily food intake and distress sale of assets (Rahman (1995)). Since many of them own 
few assets other than their labor endowment, selling labor in advance during Monga is among the 
few options they might have to avoid starvation. When households own land, they can also sell 
their crops in advance.6 Such ‘distress sale’ of labor or crops implies that the households receive 
very unfavorable prices, and thus may be trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. The average wage 
received for advance labor sale is about 50 percent of the wage in the spot market (Rahman (1995)). 
Access to credit in such a situation can potentially make a big difference. Microcredit is likely to 
yield higher income when used in productive activities, and fungibility of credit means that loans 
taken ostensibly for investment can be used for consumption smoothing.  Most of the microcredit 
financed projects in Bangladesh are non-farm activities, and thus are not subject to seasonality or 
weather shocks, unlike agriculture. Moreover, microcredit may be effective in mitigating the 
effects of low demand for labor in agriculture during the lean season, because it creates 
employment opportunities within the household.  
One can, however, easily find reasons to suspect that microcredit may not be an effective 
policy tool for addressing seasonal famine.  First, the standard microcredit loans are not short-term 
consumption loans, and thus a household may not be able to get a new loan when they need it 
most, i.e. during the Monga period. In fact, the rigid loan repayment schedule might make it 
difficult to buy enough food, and repay the loans at the same time.  Second, although microfinance 
groups may be helpful in the face of idiosyncratic shocks at the household level (such as health 
shocks as found by Gertler et al. (2009)), Monga is a more aggregate phenomenon (at the village 
or sub-district level) that affects many (or even most of the) households adversely in a village at 
the same time. This is likely to make the ‘solidarity group’ aspect of microcredit programs such as 
Grameen Bank and BRAC less effective in coping with Monga and other aggregate economic 
adversity, both anticipated and unanticipated.7 Thus, it is by no means obvious that access to 
microcredit necessarily makes it easier for a household to cope with seasonal adversity. Whether 
microfinance helps a household cope with Monga is thus an empirical issue.  
                                                 
6 In our data set the incidence of advance crop sale is very low, less than 1 percent. So, we do not use it as an indicator 
of a household's ability to cope with seasonal famine. 
7 The income level of most of the households in the affected regions suffers during Monga and the resulting fall in 
local demand can make nonfarm activities financed by microcredit unprofitable. 
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This paper analyzes the impact of microfinance membership on a household’s ability to 
cope with famine, with a natural focus on food security as measured by the number of meals a day 
during Monga. To understand the mechanisms behind the estimated effects on food security, we 
provide evidence on whether microcredit helps the member households in the labor market. The 
focus here is on the effects on short-term migration for work at the neighboring town or city, 
perhaps the most important avenue to escape the depressed local labor market.  We also analyze 
the effects on advance sale of labor during Monga. The focus on the labor market is primarily 
motivated by the convincing evidence in the recent literature that only a small proportion of the 
microcredit borrowers use credit for productive investment (Banerjee et al. (2015)).  If there is no 
evidence of a significant labor market effect, any positive effect on food security is likely to reflect 
pure consumption smoothing role played by microcredit.   
An important advantage of our study is that we have an exceptionally large data set on 
143,000 poor and ultra-poor households (monthly household income less than Tk. 1,500 which 
was approximately $21 in 2006) which was collected by the Institute of Microfinance (InM), 
Dhaka, through a household census of the Monga-prone districts in Northern Bangladesh.8 A 
second important advantage is that our sample covers many different microfinance NGOs working 
in Northwestern Bangladesh including Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA and BRDB. Our estimates 
give average effects of the different programs, and thus can lay claim to a higher level of generality 
compared to most of studies that focus on one specific microfinance program with a relatively 
small sample size of ultra-poor households.  
Identification and estimation of the effects of microfinance membership is difficult because 
of selection biases arising from a household’s participation decision and the screening by the MFIs 
(for a discussion, see Armendáriz and Morduch (2010)).  Our main empirical strategy is motivated 
by the screening process of MFIs in Bangladesh, especially as it relates to the ultra-poor 
households.  While MFIs have in general been successful in reaching the moderate poor, the ultra-
poor are more often excluded from microcredit services (see the discussion in Matin (1998), and 
Emran et al. (2014)).  The focus on moderate poor reflects an uneasy tradeoff between the poverty 
alleviation and repayment objectives of MFIs (Salim (2013), Emran et al. (2014)).   Land 
ownership has been used by most of the MFIs in Bangladesh as a screening device.  The 
                                                 
8 We are not aware of any other work that utilizes such a large data set to analyze the effects of microfinance on ultra-
poor households.  
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microfinance programs are supposed to use half acre (50 decimal) land ownership as a cut-off, but 
the evidence in the literature shows that the half-acre rule is often violated (Morduch and Roodman 
(2014)).  Consistent with the literature, we find that the half-acre landownership has little power 
in explaining the microfinance membership in our data set and thus cannot be the basis for an 
instrumental variables approach.  Our approach instead exploits the fact that, to improve the 
repayment rate, MFIs try to exclude the ultra-poor, defined by BRAC and others as households 
owning less than 10 decimal land.  We show that there is evidence of both a jump and a kink in 
the probability of MFI membership at the 10 decimal land ownership threshold: the households 
with less than 10 decimal land are less likely to be included in the MFI program (after controlling 
for land owned and land squared).  We provide estimates from three estimators: fuzzy regression 
discontinuity, fuzzy regression kink design, and the local 2SLS (henceforth L2SLS) approach 
developed by Dong (2017) which exploits both the jump and kink instruments for estimation. The 
estimates from the L2SLS are the most credible in our context with a binary treatment and both a 
jump and kink in participation probability at the 10 decimal threshold (see the discussion by Dong 
(2017)).9  
The results from our empirical analysis provide robust evidence in favor of a beneficial 
effect of microfinance membership on a household’s ability to cope with hunger during the 
seasonal famine (Monga).   The probability that a household survives on 1 meal a day during the 
hungry season declines by 47 percentage points for the microfinance members according to our 
preferred L2SLS estimate.10  The estimated effect is larger according to both fuzzy RD and fuzzy 
RKD estimates. This suggests that the poorest of the poor who struggle at the margin of 1 and 2 
meals a day benefit substantially from microfinance.  The relatively moderate poor for whom the 
relevant margin is 2 and 3 meals a day also seem to benefit, but to a lesser extent.  Microfinance 
membership improves the probability of having 3 meals a day during Monga by 26 percentage 
points according to the L2SLS estimate. Again, the effect is larger according to the fuzzy RD and 
fuzzy RKD estimates.  The evidence on the mechanisms based on L2SLS estimates shows that the 
                                                 
9 In the empirical results section, we also discuss and report estimates from the recently proposed minimum biased 
inverse probability weighted (MB-IPW) estimator by Millimet and Tchernis (2013). The estimates from MB-IPW 
are useful in two ways: (1) a comparison of OLS, MB-IPW, and L2SLS estimates help us better understand the 
direction of omitted variables bias, and (2) they provide a robustness check without imposing exclusion restrictions. 
10 We use three meals a day as an indicator of food security, as it is the norm in rural Bangladesh to have three full 
meals when a household has enough wealth. It is important to appreciate the fact that even the three meals are not 
likely to supply enough nutrition (especially protein) nor calories during Monga for most of the poor households. 
6 
 
probability that a household can take advantage of short-term migration for work to cope with 
seasonal famine is close to zero for the microfinance households.  Thus, a salient mechanism for 
income generation for the poor and ultrapoor facing a depressed local labor market is clearly not 
operative. There is also no evidence of a reduction in the probability of distress sale of labor in 
advance at low wages.  The evidence thus suggests that microfinance is ineffective in addressing 
the labor market failure during the seasonal famine, and thus unlikely to have a substantial positive 
income effect during the hungry season. The positive effects found for food security are thus likely 
due primarily to consumption smoothing. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section (2) provides a brief background of 
the persistent seasonal famine (Monga) in Bangladesh. The next section discusses our empirical 
strategy. Section (4) is devoted to a discussion of the data and main variables. The empirical results 
are reported in section (5). The paper concludes with a summary of the empirical findings. 
 
(2) Monga: The Season of Deprivation and Starvation  
 
Despite the enormous social and economic progress made in last few decades, Bangladesh remains 
a poor country. While poverty fell nationwide from 49 to 40 percent between 2000 and 2005 
(World Bank (2008)), the rural poverty rate in Rangpur district and surrounding areas in Northern 
Bangladesh was 56 percent in 2005 (Khandker et al. (2012)). Five million of Bangladesh’s poor 
live in the ‘Greater Rangpur’ region, an area plagued almost every year by Monga, a season of 
near famine (World Bank (2008)).  
An agricultural phenomenon, Monga is a season of severe food deprivation that strikes 
parts of Bangladesh with disturbing regularity.  Locally known as Mora Kartik, or October the 
month of deprivation, it is “the bane of the rural poor, the season of half-meals and debt bondage” 
(Rahman (1995), p. 234).  Every mid-September through mid-November there is a fall in income 
for the poor landless households primarily because of a lack of employment, and consequently 
households find it difficult to buy enough food for three meals a day.   It is important to note that 
seasonal hunger is the consequence of seasonal income fluctuations among the ultra-poor whose 
income is barely enough to survive during regular times. It is not primarily the result of a shortage 
of food, the real problem is one of seasonal ‘entitlement failure’ in the sense of Sen (1981).  
In rain-fed areas, the agricultural calendar in Bangladesh is divided into two main growing 
seasons. Aus, the wet season first paddy crop is grown when enough rainfall occurs (April to 
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August). Aman, the wet season second rice crop lasts from July to December. In addition, if 
irrigation is available, a third rice crop, called Boro, can be planted after Aman. The hunger months 
occur between the planting and harvest of Aman, the autumn rice crop, when there is a shortage 
of employment and wages are very low but grain prices are high (Rahman (1995)). Thus, Monga 
repeats itself almost every year around September to November after the previous season’s food 
has run out, before the transplanted rice is harvested in December. These months, and especially 
October, give rural people a harder time than usual because of extremely limited job opportunities 
(Muqtada (1975), Hossain and Bayes (2009)). Evidence shows that this variation in income is 
more pronounced in Greater Rangpur area which is the focus on our study than it is in other parts 
of the country (Khandker (2009)).  
The Monga-affected region of Greater Rangpur, encompasses the districts of Gaibandha, 
Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, and Rangpur. In the Monga of October 1991, Greater 
Rangpur experienced an average 50 percent drop in the daily wage rate compared to the rest of the 
year (Rahman (1995)). The existing evidence shows that the inhabitants of Greater Rangpur are 
poorer than the rest of the country in terms of a variety of indicators including income, expenditure, 
and poverty level.  Extreme poverty in Greater Rangpur is 48 percent compared to the national 
rural average of 31 percent in 2005 (Khandker et al. (2012). Also, the daily wage rate in the same 
year was for male agricultural workers in Greater Rangpur is 46 taka compared to 64 taka found 
elsewhere (Khandker et al. (2009)). During Monga, the landless ultra-poor are especially hard hit 
as they cannot find employment. 
Seasonal variation in income is, however, not unique to Bangladesh, it is common to 
agrarian economies. In addition to Bangladesh, Devereux et al (2012) discuss seasonality in China, 
Ethiopia, India, Malawi, Niger, Peru, and Sub-Saharan Africa. With monsoon-dependent crops 
and a lack of irrigation, agricultural households in Indian villages receive on average 75 percent 
of their annual income in the span of a three-month period (Chauduri and Paxson (2001)). When 
combined with extreme poverty, seasonal variation in income translates to seasonal hunger. 
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) found consumption of rural households in Ethiopia to vary greatly 
over a short period of time. Malawi has its own hungry season, as one of its citizen recounts: 
“Come January, most people are forced to tighten their belts and wait until harvest…We call this 
period ‘the hungry season’. In the countryside, people are working the hardest … but doing so 
with the least amount of food. Understandably, they grow thin, slow, and weak” (Kamkwamba 
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and Mealer, (2009, p. 71)). Seasonal hunger in turn is the “father of famine” (Devereux et al 
(2008)). The distinction between seasonal hunger and famine is one of severity. Periodically, an 
annual shortfall in income will be so severe as to cause a famine.  
 
(3) Empirical Strategy  
To understand the issues involved in identification and estimation of the effects of microfinance 
on a household’s ability to cope with seasonal famine, consider the following triangular model: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′Γ + 𝜉𝑖      (1) 
𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖
′Π + 𝜀𝑖        (2) 
 
Where (1) is the outcome equation and (2) is the selection equation. The outcome equation shows 
household i’s ability to cope during Monga (𝐶𝑖), as a function of membership in any Microfinance 
Institution (𝑀𝑖), household and village characteristics (𝑋𝑖), and an error term (𝜉𝑖). As noted earlier, 
the outcome variables we focus on are indicators of household food security (number of meals a 
day), incidence of advance labor sale, and migration in search of work during Monga.  
The parameter of interest is 𝛽1 in equation (1) which indicates the effect that microfinance 
membership has on a household’s ability to cope during Monga.  OLS and Probit estimation of 
equation (1) is likely to yield biased results.  The endogeneity arises from the fact that there are 
individual, household and village level unobserved factors that may affect both the outcome and 
the selection equations, and thus the correlation between the error terms is not zero, i.e., 𝜌 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜉𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0. The most obvious individual-level common unobserved heterogeneity in the 
context of microfinance is ability (or entrepreneurial capability). An individual with higher ability 
would expect higher net return from participation in the credit program, and thus would self-select 
into the program. But higher ability may also mean that she will have better economic outcomes 
in the absence of credit availability. This creates a positive selection effect, and 𝜌 > 0 on this 
account. However, it is also possible that the outside option for a high ability entrepreneur is much 
better (shadow price of time is higher), and thus she might not be interested in high interest rate 
microloans with its web of restrictions (such as group liability, and substantial time commitments 
for regular group meetings).  If this is the case, MFI would attract relatively low ability micro-
entrepreneurs and thus the selection would be negative implying 𝜌 < 0.  
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The correlation between 𝜉𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 can also arise because of nonrandom placement of MFI 
programs (and branches) across different villages.  For example, to ensure high repayment rates, 
the MFIs have incentives to select villages with concentration of moderate poor and eschew the 
most vulnerable villages with concentration of ultra-poor.  The MFI can also use information about 
a village’s economic potential to pick better endowed villages.  This would result in a positive 
correlation between the error terms in equations (1) and (2) above implying 𝜌 > 0. But if the MFIs 
are true to their objective of poverty alleviation, then they will target relatively unfavorable 
villages, thus making 𝜌 < 0 The available evidence shows that the objective function of 
microfinance NGOs is a convex combination of poverty objective and repayment objective (Salim 
(2013)). 
(3.1) Tackling Omitted Variables Bias: Alternative Approaches 
When the outcome variable is binary, as is the case in our application, one can estimate the 
triangular model using maximum likelihood under the assumption that 𝜉𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 are approximately 
bivariate normal without imposing any exclusion restrictions. However, such identification relies 
on the nonlinearity of Normal CDF, and is regarded as non-robust (Altonji et al, (2005)). In the 
absence of any exclusion restrictions, one can also use various matching methods (Heckman and 
Navarro-Lozano (2004), Heckman et al. (1998), Hirano and Imbens (2001)). However, the 
matching methods rely on the assumption that there is no significant selection on unobservables 
conditional on matching on the observable characteristics.  This is a strong assumption, unlikely 
to hold in our context.  
Recent literature has developed ways to minimize and correct for the bias that results from 
the failure of the conditional independence assumption (CIA).  We use the Minimum Biased 
Inverse Probability Weighted IPW (MB-IPW) estimator proposed by Millimet and Tchernis 
(2013) which provides a way to reduce the bias. The Minimum-Biased IPW estimator adapts the 
normalized Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001) by 
exploiting a result due to Black and Smith (2004) that the bias minimizing propensity score is 
equal to 0.50 when estimating the average treatment effect on the treated. The MB-IPW estimator 
restricts the sample to the observations with a propensity score in the “neighborhood” around the 
Bias Minimizing Propensity Score (BMPS). This can be thought of as a formalization of the 
increasingly common practice of reducing bias in matching and propensity score weighted 
estimates by excluding observations from the tails of propensity score distribution (see, for 
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example, Moretti and Kline (2014)). Millimet and Tchernis define the neighborhood around the 
‘BMPS’ as observations with a propensity score within a radius 𝜃, such that at least 𝜃 percent of 
both treatment and control groups are included (after trimming observations with a BMPS below 
0.02 and above 0.98). They set this radius at 0.05 and 0.25.  Motivated by the Monte Carlo 
evidence, we implement the MB-IPW estimator with a radius of 0.25. 
  
  (3.2) Identification Based on 10 Decimal Land Threshold 
 Our main identification approach is inspired by the recent literature on Regression Jump 
and Kink Design (Nielson et al. (2010), Card et al (2012), Dong (2017)).  While it has long been 
known that a jump (or a discontinuity) in the participation probability at a policy threshold 
generates credible identifying variation, the recent advances in the literature has clarified the 
advantages of such a design for nonexperimental data (for a survey, see Lee and Lemieux (2010)).  
The general idea is that observations within a close neighborhood around the threshold are similar 
except for the fact that some received treatment while others did not because of idiosyncratic 
factors beyond their control, thus mimicking a local randomization.  Differences in their outcomes 
can then be attributed to the effect of the treatment. An interesting recent extension called 
regression kink design (RKD) shows that, in the absence of a discontinuity, a kink (i.e., a change 
in the slope) in the probability of participation at a threshold created by program design or policy 
rule can provide the basis for identification.  The approach is implemented as an instrumental 
variable estimator when compliance is imperfect.11 In our context, while the MFI loan officers 
tried to exclude high repayment risk ultra-poor households with less than 10 decimal land, this 
screening process was less than perfect.   
  In the context of microfinance in Bangladesh, it is widely discussed in the literature that 
MFIs use land ownership of potential borrowers as a screening mechanism (for a discussion, see 
Mahmud and Osmani (2017)).  Following Grameen Bank, most MFIs in Bangladesh, at least in 
principle, use less than half an acre (50 decimal) of land ownership as an eligibility criterion, 
ostensibly to target the poor.  This suggests half an acre of land as a possible cutoff, as was used 
in Pitt and Khandker (1998), Morduch (1998), and Menon (2006), among others.  However, there 
                                                 
11 Nielson et al (2010) first coined the term “RKD” and demonstrated that it is enough that there is a kink in the 
treatment probability to achieve identification.  Building on the Nielson et al (2010) paper, Card et al (2012) present 
a fuzzy RKD for the case when treatment is continuous.   
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is substantial evidence that most of the MFI programs, in many cases, fail to adhere to the half-
acre rule. Moreover, it might be subject to manipulation by credit constrained households, a 
possibility especially important in our context given the weakness of land administration and 
record keeping in Bangladesh.  In our data set, there is no evidence that the half-acre rule is an 
important factor in determining which households get microcredit and which do not.  As shown in 
Table 1, the half-acre land dummy is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the 
microcredit membership equation.  
We instead rely on the widely-documented fact that the standard microcredit programs 
systematically exclude the ultra-poor, motivated by the goal of ensuring high repayment rates (see, 
e.g. Noor et al. (2004), Rabbani et al. (2006), Emran et al. (2014), Mahmud and Osmani (2017)).  
This suggests a different land ownership cutoff that is potentially important for explaining 
microcredit membership because most of the MFIs in Bangladesh define a household as ultra-poor 
if it owns less than 10 decimal land.  BRAC’s specialized CFPR-TUP asset transfer program uses 
10 decimal land as an eligibility criterion for ultra-poor (see Emran et al. (2014), Matin et. al. 
(2008)).  The households with less than 10 decimal land belong to “landless I” (with no land) and 
“landless II” (own only homestead land) categories according to the landlessness definitions used 
by Land Occupancy Survey of 1977-78 done by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in collaboration 
with USAID.12  The importance of 10 decimal land cut-off for MFI membership is confirmed by 
the regression evidence presented in column 2 of Table 1; the coefficient on the dummy for less 
than 10 decimal land-ownership is -0.056 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
(standard error is 0.01), after controlling for land owned and its square term along with village 
level controls and district fixed effects. The ultra-poor households are thus less likely to receive 
microcredit.  Figure 1 shows that there is a visible jump in the probability of MFI membership 
around the 10-decimal threshold using the 20 percent sample around the threshold (10 percent 
above and 10 percent below).  Figure 2 shows the corresponding graph for the 10 percent sample 
(5 percent above and 5 percent below).  The jump in the probability of MFI membership at the 10 
decimal land threshold can be used in a fuzzy RD design with the 10 decimal dummy as an 
instrument in an 2SLS regression, after controlling for possible direct effect of land on the outcome 
variables. 
                                                 
12 The households with half-acre land are classified as “landless III”. The half-acre eligibility criterion used by the 
standard microfinance programs is based on this definition of landlessness. 
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The graphs also suggest that the slopes of the propensity score function may be different 
below and above the 10-decimal threshold.  To check if the slope of the propensity score function 
changes at the 10-decimal threshold giving rise to a kink, we regress the dummy for MFI 
membership on the interaction of the dummy for 10 decimal with rescaled land owned (=land 
owned – 10).  The coefficient on this variable is -0.036 with a standard error of 0.012 (significant 
at the 1 percent level).  This suggests that there is a kink in the probability of MFI membership at 
the 10-decimal land ownership threshold. We thus use the interaction as an instrument in a fuzzy 
RKD design. 
In a recent paper, Dong (2017) proposes a local 2SLS estimator for the case when there is 
evidence of both kink and discontinuity at a threshold and the treatment is binary as is the case in 
our application.13 We thus implement the L2SLS approach suggested by Dong (2017) which 
applies the 2SLS estimator to a subsample of observations around the threshold employing both 
the jump and kink instruments. The estimates from the L2SLS approach are the most credible in 
our application. 
  A key issue for identification using 10 decimal land ownership cut-off is whether it is 
manipulated by the households.  The worry is that the poorest of the poor households with less 
than 10 decimal land might misreport higher than 10 decimal land to increase their odds of getting 
credit.  This assumes that the practice of excluding ultra-poor with less than 10 decimal land was 
widely known to the households.  However, unlike the 50-decimal (half-acre) eligibility criterion, 
the 10-decimal cut-off used by the loan officers was not widely publicized. So, it is likely that 
many of the households were not aware of the 10 decimal cut-off, and the possibility of 
manipulation is much less in this case. Second, even if some ultra-poor households over-report 
land to increase their probability of getting loans, the fuzzy jump and kink design remains valid as 
long as they cannot precisely manipulate the land ownership information to meet the de facto 
exclusion rule used by the loan officers. Third, if the households are successful in manipulating 
the selection process by overstating land ownership, we should observe a lump in the land 
distribution just above the 10-decimal threshold. However, a McCrary (2008) test does not show 
any such lump above the threshold (see Figure 3).  A test of the null hypothesis that the households 
                                                 
13 The existing identification results for the RKD design is derived in the context of a continuous treatment. For an 
excellent discussion, see Dong (2017). 
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over-report land ownership to increase their odds of getting credit is soundly rejected at the 1 
percent level.  
As additional evidence, we check whether the households in the sample around the 10-
decimal land threshold are sufficiently similar in terms of observables.  Figure 4 displays Quantile-
Quantile Plots comparing the control variables for microfinance members with those of non-
members using the 10 percent sample around a tenth of an acre.14  Except for distance to secondary 
school, all the other controls appear balanced on either side of the 45-degree line.   
An important advantage of our data for L2SLS, fuzzy RD and fuzzy RKD estimation is 
that it is exceptionally large.  This allows us to trim the data around the threshold considerably 
while still retaining enough power to yield credible estimates.  Our main estimates use a 10 percent 
sub-sample consisting of 24,132 households, which is much larger than the other household data 
sets used for microfinance evaluation in Bangladesh.  The 10 percent sample consists of 
households with land ownership in a very small interval: [6 decimal, 16 decimal] (1 acre = 100 
decimal).  This considerably strengthens the credibility of the estimates as it is unlikely that the 
effects are driven by differences in land ownership.  To be as clinical as possible, we control for 
quadratic effects of land on the outcome variables that takes into account possible diminishing 
returns. 
   
(4) Data  
The data used in this paper were collected by the Institute of Microfinance (InM) in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. The InM and Palli Karma Shahayak Foundation (PKSF), non-profit government 
organizations, jointly conducted a census of poor households in the district of Lalmonirhat in 2006 
and in the districts of Gaibandha, Kurigram, Nilphamari, and Ranpgur in 2007. The sample was 
limited to the poor households meeting at least one of the following three criteria: less than 1,500 
taka of monthly income, dependent on day labor, or having less than 50 decimals (half an acre) of 
land (Uddin (2008)). 
The questionnaire used to collect the data covered a broad range of topics including 
employment, family size, assets, migration for work during Monga, food security, and membership 
in any microfinance institution. The census was conducted during normal (non-Monga) time and 
                                                 
14 See Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) for recent use of quantile-quantile plots. 
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Monga-values refer to the seasonal famine during the previous lean season. An example of a 
question asked of households is “During the last Monga how many times a day did you eat (how 
many meals)?” This provided information on whether a household could consume three meals or 
was facing starvation with only one or two meals a day during Monga. 
The outcome variables we focus on in this paper are indicators of food security, distress 
sale of labor, and short-term migration during the seasonal famine. We use two indicators of food 
security: binary variables for ability to have three meals and one meal a day during last Monga. 
We use a dummy for migration during Monga to understand the possible effects of relaxation of 
credit constraints on seasonal migration for work at the towns and cities. Another labor market 
indicator we use is advanced labor sale during last Monga, which can be thought of as an indicator 
of distress sale. Village-level variables were collected in a separate questionnaire and included 
information on the moneylender interest rate; agricultural wages; electricity use in the village; and 
distances to the nearest bank, market, and secondary school. 
This paper focuses on the Districts of Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, and Nilphamari as they had 
the most complete data set (Kurigram and Rangpur were lacking village-level variables). For the 
basic OLS and Probit estimates, we use a sample of 143,346 households.  Although the household 
census covered a much larger sample of 280,000 households, a subset of villages was covered by 
the village survey.  Our sample consists of those households where the village survey was carried 
out.  More important, to implement the L2SLS estimator we need to restrict the sample by 
excluding the households far away from the 10 decimal land threshold. After dropping the 
households with missing variables, and restricting to the observations in the 10 percent of the 
sample around the 10 decimal land threshold, we focus on 24,132 households for the main 
empirical analysis. Table A1 in the appendix reports summary statistics of the main variables used 
in our analysis.  
 
(5)  The Effects on Food Security  
We begin our discussion with OLS and Probit estimates. Given the binary-binary structure 
of our empirical model, Probit estimates may be more efficient, but the OLS may be more robust, 
as it does not rely on distributional assumptions. The estimates from OLS and Probit are, however, 
very similar, and we thus focus on the OLS results in the main text (see Table 2), and report the 
Probit results in the online appendix (see appendix Table B1). The set of controls used in different 
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specifications include household level controls (age and age squared, land owned, and land 
squared), and village level controls (electricity use in the village, and distances to the bank, market, 
and secondary school).  The controls are selected to reduce biases due to self-selection by 
households and MFI program placement. For an extended discussion on the choice of control 
variables, please see the online appendix. 
The broad picture that emerges from the OLS results for the full sample (143,346 
households) reported in Table 2 panel A is that microfinance membership seems to have a small 
positive effect on a household’s ability to cope with Monga.  The OLS estimates suggest that 
microfinance membership increases the probability that a household can have three meals a day, 
and reduces the probability that a household survives only on one meal a day, and thus help avoid 
hunger during the seasonal famine.  The estimated effects from the most complete specification 
including household and village characteristics are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
In terms of magnitude, microfinance membership raises the probability of consuming three meals 
a day by about 1 percentage point, and reduces the probability of surviving on one meal a day by 
about 3 percentage points, which are not substantial.15  The estimated impacts on three meals and 
one meal a day are robust across the samples; please see the results in panel B for the 20 percent 
sample and panel C for the 10 percent sample in Table 2.  
These preliminary OLS results are interesting, but are subject to potentially serious 
endogeneity bias due to omitted heterogeneity that affects both the selection into the program, and 
the outcomes. In addition, measurement error may partly be responsible for very small numerical 
magnitudes of the OLS estimates in Table 2. To get a sense of the potential bias in the OLS 
estimates, we report estimates from the minimum bias (MB) estimator due to Millimet and 
Tchernis (2013) that reduces the omitted variables bias without any exclusion restrictions; the 
estimates are in column (4) of Table 2.  Estimates that address the biases more effectively come 
from the identification approach based on the 10 decimal land threshold developed above in 
section (3); they are reported in Table 3 and discussed later in this section. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Note, however, that the OLS results may be significantly biased downward due to negative selection and 
attenuation bias. The results reported later that correct for the bias seem to confirm this suspicion. 
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(5.1) Estimates from Minimum Biased IPW Estimator  
In this sub-section, we discuss the results from the Minimum Biased IPW (MB-IPW) 
estimator reported in column (4) of Table 2.  We use the full specification with household and 
village controls in column (3) of Table 2.  The point estimates from the MB-IPW applied to the 
full sample of households are larger when compared to the corresponding OLS estimates in column 
(3), suggesting that the bias in the OLS estimates is negative.  In terms of magnitude, microfinance 
increases the probability of three meals by 1 percent, decreases the probability of only one meal 
by 5 percent.  The 90 percent confidence interval shows that the effect of microfinance membership 
is statistically significant for all four outcomes.  The MB-IPW estimates from the 20 and 10 percent 
sub-samples are reassuring in that the point estimates are robust in these subsamples for the three 
meals and one meal outcomes. 
   Note that the 20 percent and 10 percent samples are symmetric around the threshold in 
that they include one half of the households from above and the other half from below. These are 
included as a benchmark, since we will focus on the 10 percent sample for our main estimation, 
because the L2SLS estimator uses only a subsample of observations from the neighborhood of a 
threshold (Dong (2017)). 
 
(5.2) Evidence from Identification Based on the 10 Decimal Land 
Threshold 
Our main results on the effects of MFI membership on food security of a household during 
the Monga period are in Table 3; we report estimates from three different IV approaches: fuzzy 
RD, fuzzy RKD, and L2SLS. Following Dong (2017), we use a subset of the observations in the 
neighborhood of the threshold for estimation.  The results reported in Tables 3 are based on the 10 
percent sample: 5 percent from above the 10-decimal threshold and 5 percent from below.   
We control for the direct effect of land ownership on the outcome variables in the 
regressions.  One would expect that the effect of land on the outcome variables is concave because 
of diminishing returns. However, the sample covers a narrow interval of land ownership, with a 
minimum of 6 decimal and a maximum of 16 decimal (1 acre = 100 decimal).  Since the households 
vary little in terms of land ownership, the direct effect is likely to be well approximated by a linear 
control term.  We take a conservative approach and report the estimated effects with quadratic 
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controls for land ownership.  The results with a linear land ownership control are similar and 
reported in the online appendix Table B2.     
 The first two columns report the fuzzy RD estimates where a dummy for less than 10 
decimal land is used as the instrument, i.e., the “jump instrument”; and the second and third 
columns contain the results for the fuzzy RKD where we use the “kink instrument”, i.e., the 10 
decimal land dummy interacted with (land owned – 10). The last two columns report our preferred  
estimates from the L2SLS approach of Dong (2017) where both the “jump” and “kink” instruments 
are used together. The odd numbered columns report estimates when we control for possible direct 
effect of land ownership by including land owned and its square in the regressions, but no other 
controls are included.  It is important to appreciate that our main sample (i.e., the 10 percent 
sample) include a very small interval of land distribution, which implies that land ownership is 
unlikely to be a major determinant of the observed variations in the outcomes.16  The even columns 
in addition include household and village characteristics described in detail in the online appendix 
A.     
The first stage results reported in the lower panel of Table 3 show that the dummy for less 
than 10 decimal land ownership has a negative effect on the probability of microfinance 
membership, and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The lower probability of 
microcredit membership found among the ultra-poor is consistent with substantial evidence 
accumulated over last four decades that the microcredit programs in Bangladesh consider them 
repayment risk and thus systematically exclude them (see the discussion in Emran et al. (2014), 
and Matin et al. (2008)).   The “kink instrument”, i.e., the interaction of 10 decimal dummy with 
rescaled land (land owned - 10), also bears a negative sign across specifications, and is significant 
at the 1 percent level.  When both instruments are used, the kink instrument loses its significance, 
and identification in this case seems to be primarily driven by the 10 decimal dummy.  The Angrist-
Pischke (A-P) F statistics for the jump and kink instruments reported in first four columns show 
that the IV estimates are not subject to weak instrument bias: in only one case the A-P F statistics 
is marginally lower than 10 (9.61).  The A-P F statistic falls when we use two instruments together 
because the kink instrument loses significance and A-P F incorporates penalty for more 
instruments.  
                                                 
16 Compare them to the minimum=0 and maximum=363 decimal in our “full” sample with 143,346 households. 1 
acre = 100 decimal. 
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The instruments based on the 10 decimal land provide us the local average treatment effect 
for those households which have more than 10 decimal land and thus were selected into the 
program.  As noted before, the 10 percent sample used for the IV estimation includes households 
with land in the interval of [6 decimal, 16 decimal].  The treatment households captured by the 
three different IV approaches thus belong to the right of 10 decimal in the above interval. 
 
The Estimated Effects  
The estimates in Table 3 show that microcredit membership consistently has a beneficial 
effect on a household’s food security during the seasonal famine.  Microcredit-member households 
were more likely to have 3 meals a day and to avoid surviving at the brink of starvation with only 
one meal a day (estimates are significant at the 1 percent level in 8 out of 12 cases in Table 3, and 
at the 5 percent level in 1 case, and at the 10 percent level in 1 case).  The magnitudes of the effect 
vary across different instruments: the estimated effect is larger when we use the interaction 
instrument (fuzzy RKD) compared to the corresponding estimates based on the 10 decimal dummy 
as an instrument (fuzzy RD). Since the effects are likely to be heterogeneous, the two instruments 
refer to different subpopulations (i.e., different LATEs).17  The L2SLS estimates for the interaction 
(i.e., kink) instrument for the outcome one meal a day are, however, implausibly large; the 
estimates are larger than 1 in both specifications, a limitation of the linear IV estimates in a binary 
outcome model.  A plausible interpretation of this evidence is that there is a subset of poor 
households for whom the probability of having one meal a day during Monga becomes zero once 
they become microfinance member.18   
The most conservative estimates of the program effect in Table 3 come from the 
specification where both instruments are used (i.e., the L2SLS); but even those estimates are larger 
than the corresponding OLS and MB-IPW estimates in Table 2.  The relative magnitudes of the 
OLS, MB-IPW, and L2SLS estimates taken together, i.e., OLS < MB-IPW < L2SLS, tells a 
consistent story about the direction of omitted variables bias:  the estimates become progressively 
larger as more effective method to address the bias is used.  This suggests significant downward 
bias in the OLS estimates owing to negative selection on unobservables and possibly attenuation 
                                                 
17 This also implies that it is not meaningful to use Hansen’s J statistic to test for instrument validity. 
18 We report the bivariate probit estimates using the interaction instrument in the online appendix.  The estimates 
suggest that the probability that the MFI households survive on one meal a day is about 22 percentage points lower. 
But these estimates refer to average treatment effect (ATE); please see the discussion in page 20 below.  
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bias caused by measurement error.  A comparison of the estimates for 3 meals and 1 meal shows 
a consistent pattern: the effect is systematically larger in the case of 1 meal a day, suggesting that 
microfinance is especially helpful for the poorest of the treatment households struggling at the 
margin of starvation during seasonal famine.  The relatively food secure households for which the 
relevant margin is between 2 and 3 meals a day also benefit from microfinance membership, but 
to a lesser extent.   
 
(6) Understanding the Mechanisms: The Effects on Labor Market Outcomes 
The evidence on the effects of MFI membership on food security in Tables 2 and 3 suggests 
strongly that the MFI members are better able to cope with hunger during the seasonal famine.  
This positive effect can be due to two different broad mechanisms: (i) higher income and (ii) 
consumption smoothing without any income gain.   
 There is an emerging consensus from RCT-based studies that microcredit may have 
positive effects on income of only a relatively small proportion of households with the requisite 
entrepreneurial ability.  Since the demand for nonfarm goods go down in the villages during 
Monga, it is likely that the nonfarm income is also adversely affected. Thus, the main channel for 
higher income for the poor and the poorest is labor market, especially through seasonal migration 
to the nearby towns. The focus on labor market is especially appropriate in our case as the 
households in our main estimation sample (the 10 percent sample) own very little land; all of the 
households fall in a narrow interval of only one tenth of an acre (the minimum is 0.06 acre and the 
maximum is 0.16 acre). We provide evidence on two labor market indicators: probability of 
seasonal migration for work during Monga, and probability of selling labor in advance at lower 
wages.  
(6.1) Does Microcredit Facilitate Seasonal Migration for Work? 
Since credit constraint is usually identified as a major factor in migration decisions by poor, 
it is reasonable to expect that MFI membership would help seasonal migration for work. We report 
estimates of the effects of MFI membership on probability of seasonal migration for work from 
different approaches in Table 4; the top panel reports the estimates from OLS and MB-IPW, and 
the lower panel contains the estimates from three estimators that rely on identification based on 10 
decimal land threshold.  
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The OLS results do not indicate any impact of microfinance on the probability of migration 
for the full sample. When we look at the 20 and 10 percent samples, we find that microfinance has 
a negative effect on migration when including only household characteristics.  However, the 
finding is not robust, as it becomes insignificant with the inclusion of village characteristics.  The 
MB-IPW estimates in last column is consistent with this pattern; the estimated effects are not 
significant in 10 percent and 20 percent samples, but suggests a small positive effect in the full 
sample (see panel A of Table 4). 
The evidence from three different IV estimates in the lower panel of Table 4 is, in contrast, 
unambiguous: MFI membership constrains the ability of the household members to migrate for 
work during the Monga period. The effect of MFI membership on the probability of short-term 
migration for work is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level across the board.  
All six estimates, however, are larger than 1 in absolute value.  One way to interpret this evidence 
is that microfinance membership reduces the probability of short-term migration during Monga 
season virtually to zero for a subset of households.   An alternative strategy is to use a bivariate 
probit model to estimate the effects using the same instruments to ensure that the estimated 
probability remains within the unit interval.  The bivariate probit estimates are reported in the last 
row of Table 4.  The numerical magnitudes of the estimates are smaller, but the qualitative 
conclusions reached on the basis of the L2SLS remain valid: microfinance membership hurts the 
ability of a household member to migrate for temporary work during the season of starvation. 
According to the biprobit estimates, the probability that a household member migrates for work 
during Monga is 15 to 20 percentage points lower for MFI member households.  However, a 
comparison of the biprobit estimates with the corresponding 2SLS estimates in Table 3 requires 
appropriate caution, because the biprobit estimates provide average treatment effect (ATE), while 
the 2SLS estimates are local average treatment effect (LATE) (for an excellent discussion on this 
point, see Chiburis et al. (2012)).19 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 We report a complete set of biprobit estimates using the 10 decimal land based instruments for all other outcomes 
in the appendix. While the numerical magnitudes are consistently smaller, the conclusions reached in this paper 
based on 2SLS remain valid. 
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(6.2) Does Microfinance Reduce Distress Sale of Labor? 
The impact of microfinance on advance labor sale by a household is reported in Table 5. 
The OLS estimates are consistently positive and significant at the 1 percent level.  The magnitude 
of the effect is small; microfinance membership increases the probability that a household does 
not need to sell labor in advance by about 1.5 percent.  As was the case for the food security 
outcomes, the coefficient for no labor sale is robust to different control variables, but the magnitude 
becomes smaller as the sample size is reduced, suggesting that the effect may not be robust. The 
MB-IPW estimate indicates a small positive effect, a 1.3 percentage points higher probability for 
the MFI households according to the estimate from the 10 percent sample. 
The evidence from the fuzzy RD, fuzzy RKD and L2SLS estimates suggest that 
microcredit membership has no perceptible effect on a household’s propensity to sell labor in 
advance; the MFI membership dummy is not significant at the 10 percent level in any of the six 
columns reported in Table 5 (please see the lower panel).  There is thus no evidence that MFI 
membership helps households to reduce their dependence on distress sale of labor during Monga. 
 
(7) Discussion 
The evidence and analysis presented above suggest that microfinance helps the poor households 
(households with land ownership between 0.06 acre and 0.16 acre) to better cope with seasonal 
starvation in Bangladesh. However, the evidence also indicates that the source of this positive 
effect is not higher household income through better labor market outcomes. The MFI households 
are less likely to escape from depressed local labor market through short-term migration for work 
at the nearby town during the season of hunger. They are also equally vulnerable to distress sales 
of labor in advance at lower wages to tide over the Monga period.  
  The evidence thus suggests that the primary role played by microcredit during Monga is 
one of consumption smoothing.  To be effective for consumption smoothing in villages, 
microcredit needs to satisfy two requirements. First, the interest rate charged on microcredit must 
be smaller than that charged by the local moneylenders, and second, the repayment schedule needs 
to be flexible when a household is unable to repay.  The evidence on interest rates in the context 
of Bangladesh is clear: the effective interest rate charged by the MFIs in Bangladesh is about 30 
percent, while the average moneylender interest rate is 103 percent according to Mallick (2012). 
Many microcredit programs that take loans from PKSF in Bangladesh, face an interest rate ceiling 
22 
 
of 12.5 percent. The MFI member households thus pay one third or lower when compared to other 
households who rely on moneylenders.  
The issue of flexibility of repayment is more complex. The common narrative in the 
literature as discussed in the introduction is that the standard microcredit contracts in Bangladesh 
are inflexible in repayment schedule. However, it seems that most of this literature refers to the 
microcredit contract used by MFIs such as Grameen before 2002, called Grameen-I in the 
documents of Grameen Bank.  The loan contracts went through a re-design after the 1998 flood in 
Bangladesh, and the resulting contract, called Grameen-II, introduced considerable flexibility in 
repayment.20 Grameen-II was implemented between 2000 and 2002. In Grameen-II, a household 
when faced with repayment difficulties, can take a “detour” from the “basic loan”, and move to a 
“flexiloan” which allows renegotiation of the repayment schedule, and freezes out the automatic 
increase in the loan size in the next cycle. Even without a detour from the basic loan, the loan 
officers take advantage of many other flexibilities built into the design of Grameen-II such as mid-
term “top-up”, and withdrawal from savings to help struggling borrowers (Rutherford (undated)).  
Following Grameen Bank, many other MFIs in Bangladesh have introduced flexibility in their 
loan contracts over the years. The evidence on both interest rate and flexibility of repayment thus 
suggest that microcredit can play a significant role in consumption smoothing in Bangladesh, 
providing additional support to the central conclusions of this paper. 
 
(8) Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on the effects of microfinance membership in Bangladesh on 
the ability of a poor household to cope with anticipated seasonal adversity using the seasonal 
famine in North-west Bangladesh as a case study.  We take advantage of an exceptionally large 
households survey data set with more than 143,000 households for the empirical analysis.  
We implement an empirical strategy that is motivated by the observation that MFIs exclude 
the ultra-poor households (with less than 10 decimal land) to ensure repayment rate.  We show 
that a household with less than 10 decimal land is significantly less likely to get microcredit.  The 
evidence suggests that there are both a jump and a kink in the probability of MFI membership at 
                                                 
20 Shoji (2010) finds that microcredit played an effective consumption smoothing role after the 2004 flood in 
Bangladesh. Shonchoy and Kurosaki (2013) present suggestive evidence that flexible microcredit contracts in 
Bangladesh helps a household to smooth consumption between lean and normal seasons without increasing default 
or average consumption level.   
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the 10 decimal threshold. We implement the fuzzy RD, fuzzy RKD, and the recently proposed 
local 2SLS estimator (Dong, 2017) that combines both the jump and kink instruments and is more 
appropriate in our context with binary treatment. We also report estimates from the Minimum 
Biased IPW estimator due to Millimet and Tchernis (2013) that reduces bias in the estimates 
without imposing any exclusion restrictions.  Our estimates from alternative samples, estimators, 
and control variables yield robust conclusions: (1) MFI membership improves food security during 
seasonal famine, especially for the poorest households who struggle at the margin of 1 or 2 meals 
a day; (2) MFI members are significantly less likely to take advantage of short-term migration for 
work during the hungry season, (3) MFI membership is ineffective in reducing the labor market 
vulnerability of ultra-poor:  the probability of advance sale of labor during Monga is not affected 
by MFI membership.  The evidence thus suggests that the MFI programs help the poor households 
to cope with starvation and hunger during the Monga season. But this positive effect is not driven 
by higher income generated through seasonal migration to urban areas for work, or by reducing 
the dependence on distress sales of labor. Microcredit fails to address the fundamental labor market 
failure at the root of localized seasonal famine in the North-West Bangladesh.  The primary 
mechanism at work is pure consumption smoothing role of microcredit, perhaps made possible by 
the introduction of flexible loan contracts in early 2000s, such as “flexiloan” and early withdrawal 
of savings offered by Grameen-II.   
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Figure 1:  Probability of MFI Membership and Land Ownership (20% Subsample) 
 
Notes: Discontinuity in probability of MFI membership with quadratic fit and 95% confidence intervals reported. 
The left hand side indicates household owning less than 10 decimals of land and the right hand side indicates those 
owning more.  The graph shows that owning more land increases the probability of MFI membership 
discontinuously.  The graph is calculated from the 20% subsample of households (49,753). (Graph generated using 
Stata Code cmogram.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.
0
0.
3
0.
5
0.
8
1.
0
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 M
FI
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p
5 10 15 20 25
Total Owned Land (decimals)
29 
 
 
Figure 2:  Probability of MFI membership and Land Ownership (10% Subsample) 
 
Notes: Discontinuity in probability of MFI membership with quadratic fit and 95% confidence intervals reported. 
The left hand side indicates household owning less than 10 decimals of land and the right hand side indicates those 
owning more.  The graph shows that owning more land increases the probability of MFI membership.  The graph is 
calculated from the 10% subsample of households (24,132). (Graph generated using Stata Code cmogram.) 
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Figure 3: McCrary Density Test 
 
 
Notes : McCrary Density Test on total land owned by the household. (Graph generated using Stata Code 
DCdensity, McCrary (2008)).  
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Figure 4: Quantile-Quantile Plots of Control Variables 
 
 
 
Note: The above empirical Quantile-Quantile Plots are calculated from the 10% subsample and display the value of 
the control variables for the treated (y-axis) and untreated (x-axis) units.  The closer the observations fall relative to 
the 45 degree line, the more similar the treatment and control groups are.   
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Table 1: Determinants of MFI Membership: The Role of 10 Decimal (0.1 acre) and 50 
Decimal (Half-acre) Thresholds 
 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MFI Member (yes = 1)      
Owns less than 10 decimals of 
land (yes = 1) 
-0.060*** -0.056***   
(0.01) (0.01)   
Owns less than 50 decimals of 
land (yes = 1) 
  -0.013 -0.012 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Land  -0.005 -0.005 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Land squared -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age of household head  0.020***  0.017*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Electricity use in village (%)  0.001***  0.002*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Distance from bank   -0.010***  -0.008*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Distance from market  0.002  0.001 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Distance from secondary school   -0.003*  0.003 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant 0.509*** 0.140** 0.568*** 0.234*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
Observations 24,132 24,132 10,276 10,276 
R-squared 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.020 
 
Note: columns (1) and (2) use the 10% subsample of observations around 10 decimals of land ownership.  Columns 
(3) and (4) use the 10% subsample of observations around 50 decimals of land ownership.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2: The Effects of MFI membership on Food Security (OLS and MB-IPW) 
        
  OLS OLS OLS (4) 
 
No 
Controls  HH controls 
HH and Village 
Controls MB-IPW 
A: Full Sample     
Three meals (yes = 1) 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010 
  (11.84) (10.45) (9.31) [0.007, 0.014] 
One meal (yes = 1)  -0.043*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.045 
  (-15.88) (-11.60) (-9.98) 
[-
0.053, -0.037] 
No. of observations 143,346 143,346 143,346 143,346 
B: 20% Sample     
Three meals (yes = 1) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010 
  (7.72) (7.45) (6.58) 
[0.00
5, 0.016] 
One meal (yes = 1)  -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.048 
  (-10.31) (-9.43) (-8.05) 
[-
0.064, -0.036] 
No. of observations 49,753 49,753 49,753 49,753 
C: 10% Sample        
Three meals (yes = 1) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.016 
  (6.34) (6.24) (5.53) 
[0.00
9, 0.024] 
One meal (yes = 1)  -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.044*** -0.055 
  (-8.66) (-8.14) (-6.78) 
[-
0.075, -0.037] 
No. of observations 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 
Notes: Panel A uses the full sample, Panel B focuses on 20% of the sample around 0.1 acres of land ownership, and 
Panel C focuses on 10% of the sample around 0.1 acres of land ownership.   
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Model (1) regresses the outcome variable against microfinance membership. Model (2) adds household control 
variables to Model (1).  Model (3) adds village controls to Model (2).  Model (4) reports the MB-IPW for the 
specification from Model (3), which stands for Minimum Biased Inverse Probability Weighted estimator due to 
Millimet and Tchernis (2013) and is estimated using a 0.25 radius.  The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
are reported.  The 90% confidence intervals in brackets are calculated by bootstrapping 250 replications. The set of 
household controls includes: age of household head, age squared, land owned, and land squared.  The village 
controls include: electricity use in the village, and distances to the bank, market, and secondary school. 
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Table 3: Effects of MFI Membership on Food Security  
Estimates from Identification Based on 10 decimal Land Threshold 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Fuzzy RD 
 
Fuzzy RD 
 
Fuzzy 
RKD 
Fuzzy 
RKD 
L2SLS 
 
L2SLS 
 
3 Meals (yes = 1) 
 
0.349*** 0.351*** 0.538*** 0.568*** 0.287*** 0.265** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.21) (0.10) (0.11) 
One Meal (yes = 1)  
 
-0.799*** -0.782** -1.517*** -1.566*** -0.564** -0.471* 
(0.30) (0.32) (0.53) (0.59) (0.27) (0.28) 
First Stage Results 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.060*** -0.056***   -0.083*** -0.083*** 
(0.01) (0.01)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x  
(Land - 10) 
   -0.040*** -0.036*** 0.021 0.025 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Angrist-Pischke F Statistic 17.54 15.48 11.60 9.61 9.05 8.18 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 
 
Notes: The above table reports results from local 2SLS, estimated from the 10% subsample around the 10 decimal of 
land threshold. Columns (1) and (2) use as an IV a dummy indicating that the household owns less than 10 decimals 
of land. Columns (3) and (4) use the interaction of this land dummy and rescaled land (land – 10). Columns (5) and 
(6) include both IVs in the first stage.  Odd numbered columns do not include any additional controls beyond land 
and land squared. Even numbered columns include for household and village characteristics: age of household head, 
age squared, electricity use in the village, and distances to the bank, market, and secondary school. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Effects of MFI Membership on Short-term Migration for Work 
A: OLS and MB-IPW 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
MB-IPW 
(4) 
Full Sample 0.004 -0.004 0.009*** 0.018 
  (1.37) (-1.38) (3.18) [0.010, 0.025] 
20% Sample -0.007 -0.012*** -0.001 0.006 
  (-1.54) (-2.74) (-0.22) [-0.008, 0.018] 
10% Sample -0.013** -0.017*** -0.005 -0.009 
  (-1.97) (-2.66) (-0.81) [-0.025, 0.015] 
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Village Controls No No Yes Yes 
B: IV Estimates  Fuzzy RD Fuzzy RKD L2SLS Biprobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
10% Sample -1.704*** -1.604*** -1.927*** -1.826*** -1.631*** -1.515*** -0.205*** -0.168*** 
  (0.47) (0.49) (0.64) (0.67) (0.45) (0.46) (0.00) (0.002) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.060*** -0.056***   -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.067*** -0.059*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x    -0.040*** -0.036*** 0.021 0.025 0.007 0.011 
(Land - 10)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
Angrist-Pischke F Stat.  17.54 15.48 11.60 9.61 9.05 8.18    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000     
 
Notes: The above table reports the estimated impact of microfinance membership on migration. Panel A reports the results from OLS the first three columns, 
where the first regresses the outcome variable against microfinance membership. The second adds household controls and the forth includes both household and 
village controls.  The forth column of Panel A reports the MB-IPW estimates, where MB-IPW stands for Minimum Biased Inverse Probability Weighted 
estimator due to Millimet and Tchernis (2013) and is estimated using a 0.25 radius.  The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated are reported.  The 90% 
confidence intervals in brackets are calculated by bootstrapping 250 replications.  Panel B reports IV estimates from the 10% subsample around the 10 decimal of 
land threshold. Columns (1) and (2) use as an IV a dummy indicating that the household owns less than 10 decimals of land. Columns (3) and (4) use the 
interaction of this land dummy and rescaled land (land – 10). Columns (5) and (6) include both IVs in the first stage.  Columns (7) and (8) report the Biprobit 
estimates including both IVs. Odd numbered columns do not include any additional controls beyond land and land squared. Even numbered columns include for 
household and village characteristics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 5: Effects of MFI Membership on Distress Sale of Labor 
A: OLS and MB-IPW 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
MB-IPW 
(4) 
Full Sample 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.020 
  (14.22) (13.34) (13.17) [0.017, 0.023] 
20% Sample 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.014 
  (5.22) (5.01) (4.88) [0.009, 0.020] 
10% Sample 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013 
  (2.95) (2.86) (2.93) [0.004, 0.020] 
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Village Controls No No Yes Yes 
B: IV Estimates  Fuzzy RD Fuzzy RKD L2SLS Biprobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
10% Sample 0.049 0.051 -0.121 -0.125 0.104 0.121 0.067 0.035 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.060*** -0.056***   -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.093*** -0.089*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x    -0.040*** -0.036*** 0.021 0.025 0.033 0.032 
(Land - 10)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Angrist-Pischke F Stat.  17.54 15.48 11.60 9.61 9.05 8.18    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000     
 
Notes: The above table reports the estimated impact of microfinance membership on distress sale of labor. Panel A reports the results from OLS the first three 
columns, where the first regresses the outcome variable against microfinance membership. The second adds household controls and the forth includes both 
household and village controls.  The forth column of Panel A reports the MB-IPW estimates, where MB-IPW stands for Minimum Biased Inverse Probability 
Weighted estimator due to Millimet and Tchernis (2013) and is estimated using a 0.25 radius.  The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated are reported.  The 
90% confidence intervals in brackets are calculated by bootstrapping 250 replications.  Panel B reports IV estimates from the 10% subsample around the 10 
decimal of land threshold. Columns (1) and (2) use as an IV a dummy indicating that the household owns less than 10 decimals of land. Columns (3) and (4) use 
the interaction of this land dummy and rescaled land (land – 10). Columns (5) and (6) include both IVs in the first stage.  Columns (7) and (8) report the Biprobit 
estimates including both IVs. Odd numbered columns do not include any additional controls beyond land and land squared. Even numbered columns include for 
household and village characteristics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics 
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Full 
Sample 
20% 
Sample  
10% 
Sample 
Has 3 full meals per day during Monga  
(yes = 1) 
0.028 0.029 0.030 
(0.166) (0.167) (0.169) 
Has 1 full meal per day during Monga  
(yes = 1)  
0.487 0.467 0.478 
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500) 
Does not sell labor in advance (yes = 1) 0.950 0.957 0.956 
  (0.218) (0.203) (0.206) 
Migrates in search of work (yes = 1)  0.493 0.501 0.508 
  (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
Age of the household head (years) 39.041 39.635 40.047 
  (11.945) (11.702) (11.794) 
Total owned land (decimals) 8.356 9.886 10.511 
  (12.245) (5.437) (2.717) 
Electricity use in the village (percent)  31.894 31.205 29.691 
  (25.782) (25.537) (25.165) 
Distance to bank (km) 4.315 4.157 4.237 
  (3.517) (3.224) (3.271) 
Distance to market (km) 3.462 3.505 3.641 
  (2.878) (2.845) (2.931) 
Distance to secondary school (km) 1.482 1.431 1.485 
  (2.087) (2.021) (2.060) 
Number of Observations 143,346 49,753 24,132 
 
Notes: Mean values for the main variables used in the analysis, with standard deviations in parenthesis.  
Column (1) reports the summary statistics for the main sample, column (2) uses the 20% sample of households 
around 0.1 acre of land ownership, and column (3) focuses on 10% of the households around 0.1 acre of land 
ownership.   
  
2 
Choice of Control Variables (𝑿𝒊) 
 The choice of the control variables is motivated by the objective of minimizing omitted 
variables in the regressions.  Since omitted variables bias arises only when a variable affects 
both the selection and outcome equations, we include observable characteristics that belong to 
the intersection set of the determinants of both these equations.  Following Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), we leave out potentially ‘bad controls’, i.e. those variables which may themselves be 
outcome variables.   
 The household variables we control for include age of the household head, age squared, 
total owned land, and land squared.  Age and its square are included as an indicator of social 
and human capital (experience and wisdom).  The social and human capital might be important 
for access to informal finance in the absence of microcredit, and thus may affect the 
opportunity cost of not joining an MFI program.  Also, MFIs may target households with 
relatively young and energetic borrowers, and thus too young or too old age will be less likely 
to get selected into the program.  We include land owned as an indicator of a household’s 
endowment.  Land obviously affects the outcome variables, such as the ability to consume 
three meals per day during Monga.  As discussed previously, land also serves as a screening 
mechanism for MFIs.  Following the RD/RKD literature, we include a polynomial of land in 
the regression.   
The village-level control variables include percent of electricity usage in a village, the 
average agricultural wage for men and women, distance to the nearest bank, distance to the 
market or business center, distance to the secondary school. All of these variables are indicators 
of the level of development of a village. Percent of electricity usage is a good measure of 
wealth that is not determined by microfinance. The average male and female wages in 
agriculture reflect unobserved land productivity, and are important as indicators of labor 
market opportunities in a village. The distance to bank captures access to formal credit market, 
and distance to business center captures access to urban market. A better access to urban market 
increases the profitability of non-farm activities financed by microcredit. Since the data lack 
information concerning the education level of the household head, we include distance to 
secondary school as an indicator of the availability of educational opportunities in the village. 
 
 
3 
Estimates from Bivariate Probit (with the Instruments) 
The main text of the paper relies primarily on 2SLS estimator for various IV estimation.  
We discuss the estimates from bivariate probit in only those cases where linearity yields 
implausible estimates (larger than one).  Some readers may be curious whether our main 
qualitative conclusions remain intact if we rely on biprobit instead of 2SLS.   The biprobit 
estimates are reported in appendix Table A2.  The estimates  support the qualitative 
conclusions based on the L2SLS results in the main text: (1) microfinance membership 
improves food security of a household during seasonal famine, (2) the poorest households at 
the margin of starvation benefit more (i.e., the effect is larger in magnitude for one meal a day), 
(3) microfinance is ineffective in reducing  a household’s propensity to sell labor in advance 
at lower wages, and (4) microfinance does not help in short-term migration to cope with 
Monga.  However, the point estimates from biprobit are different from the corresponding 
L2SLS estimates; they are much smaller in magnitude.  This pattern is not surprising, given a 
wealth of evidence in the literature that the linear IV estimates almost always are much larger 
than the corresponding Biprobit estimates in a binary-binary model (see Altonji et al (2005) 
and Chiburis et al. (2012)).  More important is the fact that the Biprobit estimates provide us 
ATET and thus refer to the average of heterogeneous treatment effects over the whole sample 
(i.e., the 10 percent sample). In contrast, the 2SLS estimates are LATEs, and thus refer to some 
subset of the households in the 10 percent sample. 
Given the differences in the estimates from L2SLS and Biprobit, one can adopt two 
alternative strategies to interpret the evidence. The first, and most conservative, is to settle on 
the robust qualitative conclusions without endorsing any preferred point estimate. This is 
perhaps the most widely acceptable interpretation. The second approach is to focus on either 
the ATET estimates from Biprobit or the LATE estimates from L2SLS.  Whether we choose 
the LATE (as done in the main text) or the ATET estimates affects the conclusion regarding 
the effects of microfinance membership on the probability of 3 meals a day most dramatically; 
the effect is numerically ignorable (about 1.5 percentage points) according to Biprobit 
estimates, but the lowest L2SLS estimate indicates a substantial impact (26 percentage points). 
This suggests that while there are some households who benefit a lot when it comes to having 
three meals a day during seasonal famine, on an average the effects of microfinance 
membership are negligible in the 10 percent sample used for local IV estimates.  
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Table A2: Local Biprobit Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Has 3 full meals per day 
during monga (yes = 1) 
0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) 0.000 -0.001**   -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) 0.00055 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x  
(Land - 10) 
  -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Has 1 full meal per day 
during monga (yes = 1)  
-0.210*** -0.193*** -0.228*** -0.216*** -0.228*** -0.215*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.036*** -0.034***   0.003 -0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x  
(Land - 10) 
  -0.052*** -0.031*** -0.044 -0.029* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Does not sell advanced 
labor (yes = 1) 0.022 0.022 -0.010 0.009 0.067 0.035 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.058*** -0.054***   -0.093*** -0.089*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.04) (0.03) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x  
(Land - 10) 
  -0.039*** -0.034*** 0.033 0.032 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Migrates in search of 
work (yes=1)  
-0.205*** -0.168*** -0.205*** -0.157*** -0.205*** -0.168*** 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.002) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.059*** -0.047***   -0.067*** -0.059*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x  
(Land - 10) 
  -0.043*** -0.032*** 0.007 0.011 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Control Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 24,132 
 
Notes: The above table reports results from local Biprobit, estimated from the 10% subsample around the 10 
decimal of land threshold. Columns (1) and (2) use as an IV a dummy indicating that the household owns less 
than 10 decimals of land. Columns (3) and (4) use the interaction of this land dummy and rescaled land (land – 
10). Columns (5) and (6) include both IVs in the first stage.  Odd numbered columns do not include any 
additional controls beyond land and land squared. Even numbered columns include for household and village 
characteristics: age of household head, age squared, electricity use in the village, and distances to the bank, 
market, and secondary school. Robust standard errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix B. Further Robustness Checks 
Table B1: Probit Results 
A: Full Sample       
  (1) (2) (3) 
Has 3 full meals per day during Monga (yes = 1) 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 
  (11.84) (10.77) (9.98) 
Has 1 full meal per day during Monga (yes = 1)  -0.043*** -0.032*** -0.027*** 
  (-15.88) (-11.48) (-9.83) 
Does not sell labor in advance (yes = 1) 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (14.22) (13.16) (13.03) 
Migrates in search of work (yes = 1)  0.004 -0.004 0.008*** 
  (1.37) (-1.49) (3.02) 
Number of observations 143,346 143,346 143,346 
    
B: 20% Sample       
Has 3 full meals per day during Monga (yes = 1) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
  (7.72) (7.45) (6.70) 
Has 1 full meal per day during Monga (yes = 1)  -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.037*** 
  (-10.31) (-9.42) (-8.06) 
Does not sell labor in advance (yes = 1) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (5.22) (5.01) (4.83) 
Migrates in search of work (yes = 1)  -0.007 -0.012*** -0.001 
  (-1.54) (-2.73) (-0.27) 
Number of observations 49,753 49,753 49,753 
    
C: 10% Sample       
Has 3 full meals per day during monga (yes = 1) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
  (6.34) (6.24) (5.60) 
Has 1 full meal per day during monga (yes = 1)  -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.045*** 
  (-8.66) (-8.14) (-6.79) 
Does not sell labor in advance (yes = 1) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (2.95) (2.86) (2.89) 
Migrates in search of work (yes = 1)  -0.013** -0.018*** -0.006 
  (-1.97) (-2.66) (-0.84) 
Number of observations 24,132 24,132 24,132 
 
Notes: See Table 2.   
 
 
6 
Table B.2: Local 2SLS Results  
(Linear control for land ownership) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Has 3 full meals per day during monga 
(yes = 1) 
0.352*** 0.470* 0.349*** 
(0.12) (0.28) (0.12) 
Has 1 full meal per day during monga 
(yes = 1)  
-0.689** -0.506 -0.693** 
(0.30) (0.54) (0.30) 
Does not sell advanced labor (yes = 1) 
 
0.024 -0.237 0.031 
(0.10) (0.23) (0.10) 
Migrates in search of work (yes = 1)  
 
-1.504*** -0.993 -1.517*** 
(0.45) (0.69) (0.45) 
First Stage Results  
Land < 10 (yes=1) 
  
-0.056***  -0.058*** 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x  
(Land - 10) 
 -0.008** 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Angrist-Pischke F Statistic 16.62 4.23 8.32 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0397 0.0002 
Control Variables No Yes No 
Observations 24,132 24,132 24,132 
 
Notes: The above table reports results from local 2SLS, estimated from the 10% subsample around the 10 
decimal of land threshold. Columns (1) and (2) use as an IV a dummy indicating that the household owns less 
than 10 decimals of land. Columns (3) and (4) use the interaction of this land dummy and rescaled land (land – 
10). Columns (5) and (6) include both IVs in the first stage.  Each model controls for household and village 
characteristics: age of household head, age squared, land owned, electricity use in the village, and distances to 
the bank, market, and secondary school. Robust standard errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table B.3: Local Biprobit Results 
(Linear control for land ownership) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Has 3 full meals per day during monga 
(yes = 1) 
  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.001**  -0.001** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x (Land - 10) 
 
 -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Has 1 full meal per day during monga 
(yes = 1)  
-0.187*** -0.174*** -0.188*** 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.033***  -0.034*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x (Land - 10) 
 
 -0.005** 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Does not sell advanced labor (yes = 1) 0.019 0.011 0.020 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.054***  -0.056*** 
  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x (Land - 10) 
 
 -0.008* 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Migrates in search of work (yes=1)  -0.166*** -0.029 -0.168*** 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) -0.046***  -0.050*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Land < 10 (yes=1) x (Land - 10) 
 
 -0.005* 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 24,132 24,132 24,132 
 
Notes: The above table reports results from local Biprobit, estimated from the 10% subsample around the 10 
decimal of land threshold. Each model controls for household and village characteristics: age of household 
head, age squared, land owned, electricity use in the village, and distances to the bank, market, and secondary 
school.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
